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Toward Restoring Rule-of-Law Norms
Dawn Johnsen*
President Donald Trump's flagrant and frequent violations of
fundamental norms of presidential behavior undermine our constitutional
democracy. They test the ability of long-standing existing systems and
institutions to sustain the rule of law, to protect fundamental rights and
values, and to check presidential wrongdoing.
This Article is part of a symposium that addresses the pressing need for
"Reclaiming-and Restoring--Constitutional Norms." As that title implies,
it will take more than simply electing different and better presidents to rectify
harms President Trump has inflicted and fault lines he has revealed. One
important lesson evident from life during the Trump Administration is the
enormous difficulty and necessity of protecting valuable norms from a
president who is deeply disdainful of government, the Constitution, and the
rule of law. Constitutional norms can and should be made more secure
through a variety of efforts that relate to the many foundational institutions
that have been targets of Trump's disdain: the federal judiciary, Executive
Branch (including law enforcement) officials, Congress, the press, states and
cities, advocacy and professional organizations, and the legal academy and
universities
This Article considers the first two of these key institutions-the federal
courts and the Executive Branch-and some common misperceptions about
their relative roles that threaten to impede the restoration of constitutional
norms. In particular, this Article highlights two types of false equivalencies
common in public discourse that cloud popular understandings and obfuscate
the depths and dangers of President Trump's wrongdoing.

*Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
1. President Trump has engaged in a range of assaults on these foundational institutions, from
repeatedly calling the press "the true Enemy of the People," Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Oct. 29, 2018), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1056879122348195841?lang
=en [https://perma.cc/9NP3-HVM7], to undermining law enforcement investigations into his own
wrongdoing while calling for criminal prosecutions of those he considers his political adversaries.
Kyle Swenson, The Ever-Growing List of People Donald Trump Says Should Be Jailed, WASH.
POST (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/29/an-incomplete-list-allpeople-donald-trump-has-said-should-be-jailed/?utm term=.f499adl22d73 [https://perma.cc/2272
-GETX]. During his campaign, Trump's disdain for the law went as far as colorfully declaring that
he could get away with murder: "I could stand in the middle of 5th Avenue and shoot somebody
and I wouldn't lose any voters." CNN, Trump: I Could Shoot Somebody and Not Lose Voters,
YouTUBE (Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-iTACHleVIaA [https://perma.cc/
G64B-3TUN]. This Article takes the existence of President Trump's serious norm violations as a
given and, rather than detail and document examples, moves directly to the Symposium's call for
solutions: What can and should be done to the end of "Reclaiming-and Restoring-Constitutional
Norms"?
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First, we tend to equate presidential wrongdoing with what the courts,
and especially the Supreme Court, ultimately will declare to be unlawful.
Witness, for example, in the face of daily news stories regarding President
Trump's connections to various wrongs and controversies, the excessively
narrow focus on what the courts or a special prosecutor might do. Whether,
for example, a sitting president can be indicted, prosecuted, and convicted.
Or whether a court will declare President Trump's financial holdings (which
undoubtedly present deeply troubling conflicts of interests in the ordinary
sense of that term) a violation of the Emoluments Clause or any other
conflict-of-interest law. Or whether any of a range of dubious financial
transactions and asset evaluations constitute a provable crime. Or whether
President Trump or anyone connected with his campaign colluded with
Russia to influence the outcome of his presidential race. Or President
Trump's legal status as an unindicted coconspirator or defendant (while in or
out of office).
This judicial focus, although understandable at one level, is grossly
disproportionate to the norms that ordinarily guide and constrain presidents.
The absence of a court ruling condemning a presidential action is, to be sure,
a notable fact, but it is far from a vindication of the President's behavior.
Courts on many occasions decline or fail to enforce the constitutional and
other legal responsibilities that presidents take an oath to uphold. Even absent
the possibility of meaningful judicial review, presidential action contrary to
those responsibilities may be unconstitutional or wrong. A multitude of
judicial doctrines prevent the courts from fully assessing presidential
wrongdoing, among them: judicial deference to the President, the lack of a
plaintiff with standing, judicial refusal to address "political questions," and a
variety of privileges. Professor Steven Vladeck, for example, has enumerated
twelve doctrines of judicial deference and restraint that the U.S. Department
of Justice asserted to defend against civil suits by individuals who suffered
torture and other serious harm during the Bush Administration. 2 Given the
current makeup of the Supreme Court, the gap between wrongful presidential
behavior and what the Supreme Court will declare unlawful is likely to grow.
Second, we tend to exaggerate and mischaracterize ostensible
similarities in presidential misbehavior, improperly equating actions of
different presidents. Although this is not a new phenomenon, Trump's
extraordinary misconduct has contributed to growing cynicism and
diminishing expectations that can be norm corroding. Take, for example, the
commonly expressed view that presidents, as a rule, have embraced
expansive conceptions of executive power to the detriment of congressional
powers, especially with regard to war powers and national security.' Or that

2. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Demise ofMerits-BasedAdjudication in Post-9/11NationalSecurity
Litigation, 64 DRAKE L. REv. 1035, 1040-41 (2016).
3. For a discussion of one prominent example-that is, the frequent mistaken equating of the
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all presidents lie to the American public. Despite elements of truth, both
statements overgeneralize in ways that can undermine the very norms we
must seek to reclaim and restore. For example, notwithstanding the fact that
previous presidents have claimed excessive powers and lied to the public,
President Trump in unprecedented ways has violated constitutional norms
core to our democratic system with sweeping claims of above-the-law
authorities and 10,111 false or misleading claims made during 828 days in
office, according to The Washington Post's ongoing count.4
Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation into Russian
interference with the 2016 election presents a prominent context in which
such false equivalencies have distorted public understandings.s President
Trump personally led efforts to frame the investigation in terms of criminal
culpability, with a drumbeat of "No Collusion" and "No Obstruction"
throughout the investigation and upon release of the redacted report.6
Trump's supporters unsurprisingly followed his lead, but the media also has
focused disproportionately through the lens of potential criminality-and
even through that lens, has failed adequately to appreciate that Mueller did
not find Trump's actions to be lawful.' On the issue of obstruction of justice,
Mueller could not have been clearer about that fact. His analysis opens by
emphasizing that, because a sitting President cannot be indicted or
prosecuted, he did not undertake a "traditional prosecutorial judgment" or an
approach that could lead to a judgment that the President had acted
unlawfully.' His introduction also emphasizes that he was unable to conclude

actions and views of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama with regard to presidential
power-see Dawn Johnsen, The Lawyers' War: Counterterrorismfrom Bush to Obama to Trump,

Jan./Feb. 2017, at 148, 151-53. For an exhaustive and insightful review of
presidential assertions of preclusive Commander in Chief authority to disregard federal statutory
restrictions on presidential war powers, see David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
FOREIGN AFF.,

Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-A ConstitutionalHistory, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 944
(2008); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest EbbFraming the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARv. L. REV. 689, 704-11

(2008).
4. Glenn Kessler et al., President Trump Has Made More than 10,000 False or Misleading

Claims, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/29/
president-trump-has-made-more-than-false-or-misleading-claims/?utmterm=.4860al07eae9
[https://perma.cc/J8BJ-9B32].
5. 1 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2019); 2 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE
2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2019).

6. E.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 18, 2018, 5:54 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1118860425599307777 [https://perma.cc/3ZAY-VL59].
7. See, e.g., Tamara Keith, Mueller Report Still Attracts Attentionfrom Both Sides of the Aisle,

NPR (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/22/715875239/mueller-report-still-attractsattention-from-both-sides-of-the-aisle [https://perma.cc/BCU5-K6G5] (discussing prioritization of
the law over morality and ethics).
8. 2 MUELLER, supra note 5, at 1-2.
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that the President was not guilty of obstruction of justice, as well as the
importance of preserving evidence because a president may be prosecuted
after he leaves office. 9
As this Article goes to print, reactions and responses to the extraordinary
Mueller investigation remain ongoing. An example more typically
illustrative of the dangers of false equivalencies and faulty understandings
related to preserving the rule of law can be found in President Trump's
actions to bar nationals from designated foreign countries from entering the
United States, commonly described as the "Travel Ban.""o Legal challenges
to Trump's Travel Ban argued, among other things, that it unconstitutionally
targeted predominantly Muslim countries in violation of the First
Amendment's prohibition on discrimination on the basis of religion." News
reports of the Supreme Court's ruling in Trump v. Hawaii2 typically
mischaracterized the Court's decision as upholding the constitutionality of
the Travel Ban.' 3
Some, though far from all, reports noted the Travel Ban's complicated
history. This includes its origins in Trump's campaign speeches and its
evolution through three presidential orders, such that the version of the Travel
Ban before the Supreme Court differed significantly from how Trump
initially formulated the Banl 4-and continued to wish he could formulate the
Ban." Losses in the lower federal courts prompted his Administration to
make significant revisions to disguise the extent of the Ban's anti-Muslim
focus.' 6 Absent those changes, the Supreme Court almost certainly would
have affirmed the lower courts and enjoined the Ban.
More to this Article's point, the overwhelming weight of press coverage
and commentary mischaracterized the Court's ruling as upholding the
legality of the third version of the Travel Ban. The thrust of headlines and
reports, and thus public understanding, fell in line with President Trump's
9. Id.
10. President Trump actually issued three versions of the Travel Ban. Proclamation No. 9645,
82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017);
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
11. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416-17 (2018).
12. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
13. E.g., Tucker Higgins, Supreme Court Rules that Trump's Travel Ban Is Constitutional,
CNBC (June 26, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/26/supreme-court-rules-in-trump-muslimtravel-ban-case.html [https://perma.cc/LA3X-NQJ5]; see also Marty Lederman, Contrary to
Popular Belief the Court Did Not Hold that the Travel Ban Is Lawful-Anything But, JUST
SECURITY (July 2, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58807/contrary-popular-belief-court-holdtravel-ban-lawful-anything-but-which-ruling-justice-kennedys-deference-presidents-enforcementban-indefensiblel [https://perma.cc/VSU3-3S5P] (citing examples).
14. See supra note 10; Higgins, supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2438 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting President Trump's
tweet: "[tlhe travel ban into the United States should be far larger, tougher and more specific-but
stupidly, that would not be politically correct!").
16. Id. at 2403-06.
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own immediate tweet declaring complete victory: "SUPREME COURT
UPHOLDS TRUMP TRAVEL BAN. Wow!"' 7
In fact, not a single Supreme Court Justice opined that the Travel Ban
was constitutional. That's worth repeating: not a single Supreme Court
Justice opined that the Travel Ban was constitutional. Professor Marty
Lederman put it well in an online post several days after the ruling: "Contrary
to Popular Belief, the Court Did Not Hold that the Travel Ban Is LawfulAnything But." 18
The issue on which the Justices divided sharply was the lower court's
grant of a nationwide preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the
Travel Ban during the course of litigation. Four dissenting Justices found that
the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their theory that President Trump was
motivated in issuing the Travel Ban by anti-Muslim religious animus in
violation of the First Amendment." For that reason, they would have upheld
the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. The Court's opinion for
the five-Justice majority emphasized that, notwithstanding evidence of
religious discrimination behind the neutral words of the President's
Proclamation, it had concluded that the appropriate standard of judicial
review was the highly deferential rational basis review standard.2 0 Rather
than closely scrutinizing the President's action in light of the evidence of
discriminatory motivation, the Court held that it would consider the question
only behind a veil of deference to the President-and that the plaintiffs had
not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits (necessary to justify a
preliminary injunction) given that the President's national-security rationale
sufficed to survive that minimal review.21

17. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 26, 2018, 8:40 AM),
[https://perma.cc/SBW8https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/101 1620271327989760
RXEG].
18. Lederman, supra note 13.
19. Justice Sonia Sotomayor's dissent (joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg) made a detailed
and compelling case that "a reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation was driven
primarily by anti-Muslim animus" and therefore the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim
that the Travel Ban violated the First Amendment. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2438 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent (joined by Justice Elena Kagan) called for the further
development on remand of the record of exemptions and waivers, during which the preliminary
injunction would remain in effect, but he concluded by agreeing with Justice Sotomayor's dissent:
If this Court must decide the question without this further litigation, I would, on
balance, find the evidence of antireligious bias, including statements on a website taken
down only after the President issued the two executive orders preceding the
Proclamation, along with the other statements also set forth in Justice Sotomayor's
opinion, a sufficient basis to set the Proclamation aside.
Id. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 2418, 2420, 2423.
21. The Court also noted that the relevant statutory source of the President's authority, the
Immigration and Nationality Act, "exudes deference to the President in every clause." Id. at 2408.
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Justice Anthony Kennedy, who provided a necessary fifth vote for the
Court's ruling and Chief Justice John Robert's majority opinion, issued an
important concurrence in which, far from blessing the Travel Ban's legality,
he revealed concern that it actually had been motivated by unconstitutional
animus.22 Kennedy wrote separately to emphasize the limited role of the
Court in reviewing presidential actions such as the Travel Ban. His short
opinion constitutes a clear caution against construing the Court's decision
not to enjoin the Travel Ban as President Trump would go on to misconstrue
it: as a validation of the President's action. To the contrary, Justice Kennedy
admonished that in such instances of "broad discretion, discretion free from
judicial scrutiny," the President and other Executive Branch officials bear a
special responsibility to adhere to "the Constitution and the rights it
proclaims and protects" and "its meaning and its promise."23 Justice
Kennedy's short concurrence merits an extensive quotation:
There are numerous instances in which the statements and actions of
Government officials are not subject to judicial scrutiny or
intervention. That does not mean those officials are free to disregard
the Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects. The oath that
all officials take to adhere to the Constitution is not confined to those
spheres in which the Judiciary can correct or even comment upon what
those officials say or do. Indeed, the very fact that an official may have
broad discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny, makes it all the
more imperative for him or her to adhere to the Constitution and to its
meaning and its promise.
The First Amendment prohibits the establishment of religion and
promises the free exercise of religion. From these safeguards, and
from the guarantee of freedom of speech, it follows there is freedom
of belief and expression. It is an urgent necessity that officials adhere
to these constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their actions,
even in the sphere of foreign affairs. An anxious world must know that
our Government remains committed always to the liberties the
Constitution seeks to preserve and protect, so that freedom extends
outward, and lasts.2 4
Given Justice Kennedy's compelling analysis of the harm inflicted when
religious animus infects governmental action, it is perhaps surprising (and in
my view, disappointing and wrong) that he did not join the dissenting Justices
in concluding that the Court's proper role demanded a more searching
scrutiny of the Travel Ban's constitutionality and that the plaintiffs were
likely to prevail. Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy did signal the terrible wrong
of religious discrimination in selectively denying Muslims entry to the United

22. Id. at 2423-24 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 2424.
24. Id.
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national counterparts a run for their money. State-government officials in
multiple states have engaged in high-stakes "power plays."3 Some have been
high profile: legislatures in North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Michigan have
used lame-duck sessions to dramatically limit the power of incoming
governors and attorneys general, or to attempt to do so.4 Similar events in
other states have received less attention: the Minnesota Governor zeroed out
the operating budget of the state legislature, for example, and the West
Virginia legislature impeached all members of its supreme court.s These
developments have in common a willingness by state officials to alter or
strain the institutions of state government-the so-called "rules of the
game"6-for short-term political advantage. If the national branches are
playing constitutional hardball, the states are playing hand grenades.
Much of the reaction to these developments has, understandably,
engaged them through the lens of political theory. Scholars and journalists
have opined that these hardball tactics bespeak democracy in crisis.' Others
have suggested policy platforms that Democrats should propose in reaction
to the (largely, but not exclusively) Republican maneuvers.' Some scholars

branch in the views of the other and that (3) creates a constitutional precedent").
3. See infra subpart I(A) (defining power plays). A number of recent news articles have used
this label, although not in precisely the way I do here. See, e.g., Jonathan Oosting, Snyder the Wild
Card in Michigan GOP's Lame-Duck Power Play, DETROIT NEWS (Dec. 14, 2018, 5:51 AM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2018/12/14/snyder-michigan-republican-powerplay/2292140002/ [https://perma.cc/BSD2-JT64]; Mitch Smith et al., Behind the Scenes in
Wisconsin: A Republican Power Play, Months in the Making, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/us/wisconsin-republicans-power.html
[https://perma.cc/38K5-6CNL].
4. Richard Fausset, North Carolina Governor Signs Law Limiting Successor's Power, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/us/pat-mccrory-roy-cooper-northcarolina.html [https://perma.cc/7ED8-TRJB]; Kathleen Gray, Snyder Tackles Most Controversial
Lame-Duck Bills Passed by Lawmakers, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Dec. 29, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2018/12/29/snyder-signs-vetoes-lame-duck-bills
/2436679002/ [https://perma.cc/BLZ4-9GEH]; Patrick Marley et al., Scott Walker Signs LameDuck Legislation Without Vetoes Curbing His Democratic Successor's Power, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (Jan. 21, 2019, 6:05 PM), https://www.jsonline.com/story /news/politics/2018/12/14/
scott-walker-signs-lame-duck-bill-curbing-powers-his-successor/2238900002/ [https://perma.cc/
F3Z8-BYAV].
5. See infra subsection I(A)(1)(c).
6. Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 681 (2011) (quoting DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990)).

7. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, North Carolina'sPartisanCrisis, NEW YORKER (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/north-carolinas-partisan-crisis [https://perma.cc/
YAA2-ZL6Z].
8. See Jacob T. Levy, The Democrats'Best Response to Republican Power Grabs,N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/opinion/wisconsin-michigan-democratshardball.html [https://perma.cc/CWZ8-BU25] (discussing reforms Democrats should urge in
response to Republican maneuvers). On the partisan asymmetry, see Fishkin & Pozen, supra note
2, at 936-37.
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have noted that, while the broader pattern is "potentially insidious," it bears
remembering that "[p]ressing the rules for full partisan advantage has long
been part of democracy."
This Essay urges consideration of another dimension of the recent power
plays: they present important, justiciable questions of state constitutional law.
Indeed, the lack of academic commentary on the legal aspects of state power
plays belies a growing body of case law in state courts. This Essay's
descriptive aim is to shine light on how power plays are unfolding in these
state laboratories. It explores eight power plays in seven states over the past
two years and describes how state courts are deciding the resulting cases.
State legislatures, governors, and arguably courts have engaged in power
plays, and their moves have implicated state constitutional clauses regarding
the separation of powers, the governors' executive power, and the protocols
for electing or appointing state officials, among others. Some power plays
are clear constitutional violations, while others occupy gray areas. State-court
decisions on these matters have ranged from ordering the political branches
to mediation to reaching broad constitutional rulings, and several variants in
between.
Yet some state judges, both in majority and dissent, have worried that
power plays are "ill-suited for judicial resolution.""o And litigants on the
losing side of the ensuing cases may have questions about whether the
litigation was appropriate or wise. These concerns and others might cause
one to wonder: is it a mistake for state courts to decide the fate of power plays
or for litigants to call upon them to do so?
It is too early to provide a full normative response; the developments
discussed herein are still unfolding. Surely power play litigation will
implicate costs as well as benefits, and for many stakeholders, the result of
any given case is what will matter most. In this Essay, prepared for a
symposium on "Reclaiming-and Restoring--Constitutional Norms," I
focus on a set of more systemic potential benefits of power play litigation
that have special application at the state level. Power play litigation is
dialogue-forcing in a state realm that needs dialogue. Whereas state
constitutions sometimes seem forgotten, adjudicating power plays may bring
state constitutions more squarely onto the radar of state officials and
communities, and foster deliberation and dialogue about state government in

9. Matt Glassman, Republicans in Wisconsin and Michigan Want to Weaken Incoming
DemocraticGovernors. Here's What's the Usual PartisanPolitics-andWhat Isn't, WASH. POST:
MONKEY CAGE (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018
/12/11 /wisconsins-and-michigans-legislatures-are-trying-to-weaken-incoming-governors-shouldyou-be-worried/?utm term-.f22294d76b6a [https://perma.cc/WK8L-WM2K].
10. Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609, 623 (Minn. 2017); Cooper v.
Berger, 809 S.E.2d 98, 127 (N.C. 2018) (Newby, J., dissenting) (arguing that the controversy was a
"nonjusticiable political question").
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a legal register rather than an exclusively political one. In addition, insofar as
power play lawsuits involve actors who were otherwise not involved in the
decision at hand-litigants, civil-society groups, and judges-adjudication
of power plays also serves the separation-of-powers value of bringing varied
constituencies into the mix of state decision-making."
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I elaborates on the definition of
power plays, catalogs recent examples, and identifies common features of
both the power plays and ensuing judicial decisions. The goal is to frame
power plays as a class of cases that can be the subject of continued study.
Part II discusses deliberation-forcing benefits of power play litigation that
have special application at the state level. This Part's aim is to surface a
systemic benefit that might be overlooked by those viewing these cases
individually, rather than to try to cash out these benefits against
countervailing costs. A conclusion observes that extant state adjudications
provide only incremental interventions against power plays and raises
questions for future work regarding the possibility of other approaches.
State Power Plays and Their Drivers
Bitter state politics are not brand new,12 but recent accounts have
depicted state governments as less prone to the bitter interbranch squabbles
that have plagued national politics.13 State officials have underscored, as a
I.

11. See Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separationof Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 752 (1999)
(articulating a concept of the separation of powers in which "every shift in governmental function
or task can be reconceived, not simply as a shift in tasks but also as a shift in the relative power of
popular constituencies"); Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalismand the Separation of Powers,
120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1122 (2011) (book review) (describing the value of "multiplicity" as an
important feature of the separation of powers).
12. Dramatic intragovernmental conflicts occurred in the nineteenth century. Bitter feuds led to
two competing Supreme Courts in Kentucky, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 151-52 (2004), and various legislative
"attacks" on state judiciaries occurred during the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian periods, JED
HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN
AMERICA 49-56 (2012) (describing these conflicts). Rhode Island's Dorr Warr, a constitutional
crisis in which the state temporarily had two competing governments, provides an extreme example.
See generally GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR (1976) (providing a history). Even in recent
years, there have been instances of officials revising the rules of the game for political advantage.
See Don'tLet Senate Seat Be Vacant, BOSTON.COM: Bos. GLOBE (Aug. 21, 2009), http://archive
.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2009/08/2 1/dont letsenateseat be
vacant/ [https://perma.cc/P9JV-DY8U] (describing the Democratic Massachusetts legislature's
2004 divestment of then-Governor Mitt Romney's power to make appointments for vacant U.S.
Senate seats); Glassman, supra note 9 (describing actions by North Carolina and Alabama to limit
the powers of their Lieutenant Governors).
13. See, e.g., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, STATE LEGISLATIVE
POLICYMAKING IN AN AGE OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION 21 (2017) [hereinafter NCSL REPORT];
Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of Polarization,97
TEXAS L. REV. 43, 55-56 (2018).
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point of pride, that they are "not D.C.,"l4 and have often steered clear of
dysfunction."s Is something changing?
Political scientists and legal scholars alike have exhaustively
documented the rise of polarization and related phenomena nationally. Here,
I will simply draw out a few factors important to the power plays I describe.
First, political parties in many states are both highly polarized, meaning that
median legislators from each party are ideologically far apart," and well
sorted, meaning that each party has a relatively consistent ideology.' 7
Furthermore, scholars have chronicled the rise of "partisan warfare"":
intense competition and animosity between the parties that seem particularly
palpable in power plays.' 9 In North Carolina, for example, political insiders
14. NCSL REPORT, supra note 13, at 17.
15. For an account of this outlook-and its demise-in Texas, see Lawrence Wright, America's
Future Is Texas, NEW YORKER (July 10, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine
/2017/07/10/anericas-future-is-texas [https://perma.cc/G8TS-EEUNJ ("While George W. Bush
was governor [of Texas], between 1995 and 2000, a cordial d6tente between the political parties
prevailed. The lieutenant governor, Bob Bullock, and Speaker Laney were both Democrats, and,
when Bush ran for President, they became exhibits in his argument that he would be a bipartisan
leader."). By 2003, the Democrats were repeatedly decamping out of state to avoid a redistricting
vote. Id.
16. Boris Shor and his colleagues have documented these trends extensively, beginning with
Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The IdeologicalMapping of State Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SC.
REv. 530, 531, 546 (2011). Data updates are available on their website, Boris Shor & Nolan
McCarty, Data, MEASURING AM. LEGISLATURES, http://americanlegislatures.com/data [https://
perma.cc/PC5E-NTAT] (last updated May 2018). For an accessible primer, see Boris Shor, How
U.S. State LegislaturesAre Polarized and Getting More Polarized (in 2 Graphs), WASH. POST:
MONKEY CAGE (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/
01/14/how-u-s-state-legislatures-are-polarized-and-getting-more-polarized-in-2-graphs/ [https://
perma.cc/69FN-8843]. In roughly half the states, polarization is higher than in Congress, which, as
the leading study's author put it, "is saying a lot." Id.
17. See MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: How LIBERALS BECAME DEMOCRATS

AND CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS 4-5, 8 (2009) (discussing the modern alignment of
party and ideology in American politics and the impact on voters' attitudes and behaviors); Gerald
C. Wright & Nathaniel Birkhead, The Macro Sort ofthe State Electorates,67 POL. RES. Q. 426,427
(2014) (describing the change "from the chaotic relationship between state partisanship and
ideology of the 1970s and 1980s to the much greater alignment of 2000 and beyond"). As Morris
Fiorina puts it, "If you are a conservative (liberal), there used to be people like you in the other
party, so the other party wasn't all bad. Now it is." Morris Fiorina, Americans Have Not Become
More PoliticallyPolarized,WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (June 23, 2014), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/23/americans-have-not-become-morepolitically-polarized/ [https://perma.cc/R76D-MCAL]. For a longer treatment, see generally
MORRIS P. FIORINA, UNSTABLE MAJORITIES:

POLARIZATION, PARTY SORTING & POLITICAL

STALEMATE, ch. 4 (2017) [hereinafter FIORINA, UNSTABLE MAJORITIES], discussing party sorting
in American politics.
18. See supra note 1.
19. See, e.g., Rick Pearson et al., Rauner-Madigan War Leads to Exodus of Lawmakers from
Springfield, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 20, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local
/politics/ct-durkin-illinois-general-assembly-turnover-met-0920-20170919-story.html
[https://perma.cc/N2PV-M4JH] (describing "the new evolution of partisanship" in which "a
willingness to work across the aisle and compromise is viewed as weakness," and how the
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describe the 2016 lame-duck developments as "more polarized and more
acrimonious" than they had ever witnessed, even during earlier bitter times.20
The fact that the recent power plays have all occurred in "purple"
states-those in which elections tend to be close calls-suggests another
contributing factor. When an election is up for grabs, political actors have
incentives to engage in fierce, zero-sum, us-versus-them behavior.2 1 State
officials may feel they should try to preserve power at all costs rather than
losing it to the other side.22 And, as Part II describes further, weak
constitutional norms in the states may fail to create counterincentives to the
pursuit of political advantage.
The remainder of this Part describes the power plays that have
transpired. Subpart I(A) addresses the defining traits of a power play and
discusses concerns that power plays raise. Subpart I(B) describes how state
courts have reacted to power plays.
A. Definitions and Concerns
This Essay defines power plays as actions that alter or aggressively
leverage institutional power and do so for partisan ends, in either of two
senses: that the actor would not make the same institutional argument if the
parties were reversed,2 3 or that the actor is undermining apparent majority

"hyperpartisan era of winner-take-all politics" has prompted many lawmakers to leave the state
legislature altogether).
20. Jason Zengerle, Is North Carolina the Future ofAmerican Politics?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/magazine/is-north-carolina-the-future-ofamerican-politics.html [https://perma.cc/WQ9K-PEWF].
21. See Frances E. Lee, Legislative Partiesin an Era ofAlternatingMajorities, in GOVERNING
IN A POLARIZED AGE: ELECTIONS, PARTIES, AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN AMERICA 115,

137 (Alan S. Gerber & Eric Schickler eds., 2017).
22. See FIORINA, UNSTABLE MAJORITIES, supra note 17, at 106-07 ("Given this uncertainty

about the electoral future, you might as well go for broke even if you suffer the consequences in the
next election."). There are other possible explanations. As Richard Primus writes, "Norm shattering
is contagious. The more the President does it, visibly, the more other actors in the system will do it,
too." Richard Primus, The Republic in Long-Term Perspective, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 19
(2018), https://repository.law.umich.edu/mronline/voll 17/issl/1 [https://perma.cc/V2QN-K978].
So perhaps national hardball feeds state power plays. Another explanation may lie in the increasing
connection between state and national policy debates. See DANIEL J. HOPKINS, THE INCREASINGLY
UNITED STATES: How AND WHY AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR NATIONALIZED 42 (2018);
Alex Garlick, NationalPolicies, Agendas, and Polarizationin American State Legislatures: 2011

to 2014, 45 AM. POL. RES. 939, 941-42 (2017) (finding greater polarization on issues with national
resonance). This phenomenon, in turn, may impede "meaningful accountability or representation"
in state government. David N. Schleicher, Federalism Is in a Bad State, HARV. L. REV. BLOG
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/federalism-is-in-a-bad-state [https://perma.cc/
44RR-AJ6P].
23. Like constitutional hardball (and constitutional showdowns), this category inevitably
involves blurry lines. See, e.g., Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 2, at 922 (describing constitutional
hardball as "necessarily fuzzy at the edges"); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 994 (describing
"the idea of a constitutional showdown" as one where "there are many related ideas that share no
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preferences for self-entrenching purposes.24 Power plays bear a close family
resemblance to the more familiar concept of what legal scholars have termed
"constitutional hardball": practices that flout widely agreed upon
constitutional understandings without violating the law outright.25 The
Republican-controlled Senate's refusal to consider President Obama's
nomination of Chief Judge Merrick Garland "stands as a classic example of
constitutional hardball." 26 Power plays to date have more commonly entailed
both changes to institutional power and actual law breaking, or at least
serious constitutional claims, but the two types of conduct are cousins at the
least.27
In the past two years, at least eight significant power plays along these
lines have occurred in seven states around the country. The remainder of this
discussion draws out common themes in these developments. Subpart I(B)
then catalogues judicial reactions.
1. Altering InstitutionalPower
a. Legislative Revision: North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Michigan.One way officials can alter institutional power is through legislation that
changes the formal powers of a branch or office. In recent years, the most
pronounced examples of this come from the legislative divestment of
executive power during lame-duck sessions. In the wake of elections in which
members of the opposing party won executive-branch offices, state
legislatures in North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Michigan held sessions in
which they removed, or attempted to remove, substantial power from newly
elected governors and attorneys general.
First, after the 2016 elections in North Carolina, the Republicancontrolled legislature in North Carolina made a series of "unusually

single common property or defining feature").
24. See generally Michael J. Klarman, MajoritarianJudicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 502 (1997) (describing "legislative and cross-temporal varieties" of
entrenchment and critiquing them "on majoritarian grounds").
25. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 523; see Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 2, at 920-26 (building on

this definition).
26. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 2, at 917.
27. See id. at 921, 923 (stating that hardball can occur either when a "political maneuver .. . is
reasonably viewed by the other side as attempting to shift settled understandings of the Constitution
in an unusually aggressive or self-entrenching manner" or when an action "violates or strains
constitutional conventions for partisan ends") (emphases omitted). As noted above, the main
difference is the assumption that hardball is not unlawful or justiciable. Two other smaller
differences are that power plays always have partisan (rather than institutional) ends and do not
involve aggressive substantive interpretations, though that line can blur. See id. at 921 n.25 (stating
that hardball may alternatively "advance the institutional interests of [a] branch or chamber");

Tushnet, supra note 2, at 535 ("Political actors can play constitutional hardball with substantive
principles.").
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aggressive" 28 efforts to limit the power of the newly elected Democratic
Governor, Roy Cooper.29 The events began when outgoing Governor Pat
McCrory called the legislature into special session to deal with disaster
relief.30 But "minutes" after that session concluded, Republican legislative
leaders called themselves into an additional special session to begin hours
later; as of that time, Democratic legislative leaders reported that they had
not been told what the additional session was about.'
Within 48 hours, the legislature approved measures that reduced the
total number of gubernatorial appointees from 1,500 to 425.32 They also
required legislative confirmation for the governor's cabinet, a move McCrory
called "wrong and shortsighted," but signed into law.33 In addition, the new
laws limited the governor's power to oversee the state elections board: rather
than appointing three members of a five-member board, the governor would
now make four appointments of an eight-member board, the legislature
would make the other four,34 and Republicans would chair the board in evennumbered (i.e., election) years.35 In addition, the new laws limited the new
governor's role in education: it transferred responsibilities over K-12
education from the governor to the superintendent of public instruction (an
office to which a Republican had just been elected) and took away the
36
governor's appointments to the trustees of the state university system.

&

28. Alison Thoet, What North Carolina's Power-StrippingLaws Mean for New Gov. Roy
Cooper, PBS: NEWS HOUR (Jan. 3, 2017, 3:57 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour /politics/northcarolinas-power-stripping-laws-mean-new-gov-roy-cooper [https://perma.cc/KUA9-96T3].
29. See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, North Carolina G.O.P. Moves to Curb Power oflNew Democratic
Governor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/us/politics/northcarolina-governor-roy-cooper-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/F5SQ-2GYU].
30. WBTV et al., Lawmakers Pass DisasterReliefFund, Move on to Other Sessions, WFMY
NEWS 2 (Dec. 15, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.wfinynews2.com/article/news/politics/awmakers
[https://perma.cc/9UAL-pass-disaster-relief-fund-move-on-to-other-sessions/83-368699104
3LMM].
31. Id.
32. Craig Jarvis, McCrory Signs Second Measure Whittling Cooper's Power, NEWS
OBSERVER (Dec. 20, 2016, 5:43 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-govermnent/
state-politics/articlel21885658.html [https://perma.cc/24ES-FRQF]. The legislature had previously
increased the number of appointments for McCrory from 400 to 1,500. David A. Graham, North
CarolinaRepublicans Try to Curtailthe New Democratic Governor'sPower, ATLANTIC (Dec. 14,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/north-carolina-special-session2016),
republicans-roy-cooper/510731/ [https://perma.cc/ML6A-GTNR].
33. Amber Phillips, North Carolina'sOutgoing GOP GovernorJust Stuck It to HisDemocratic
Successor, WASH. POST: FIX (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/12/19/north-carolinas-outgoing-gop-governor-just-stuck-it-to-his-democraticsuccessor/ [https://perma.cc/6L2P-QLPW].
34. S.B. 4, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 4th Extra Sess. § 138B-2 (N.C. 2016).
35. See id. § 138B-2(f) ("In the odd-numbered year, the chair shall be a member of the political
party with the highest number of registered affiliates ... . In the even-numbered year, the chair shall
be a member of the political party with the second highest number of registered affiliates . . . .").
36. See H.B. 17, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 4th Extra Sess. §§ 115C-1 1, 143A-44, 143A-44.3, 115C-
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Finally, the laws deprived Cooper of the ability to appoint a majority of
members to the state's Industrial Commission, a workers' compensation
board, by allowing McCrory to fill existing vacancies and by lengthening one
commissioner's term." The totality of these changes generated protests and
negative media attention, but legislators defended their actions as "majority
rule.""
Two years later, Wisconsin and Michigan took a page from North
Carolina's "playbook." 39 In both states, the Republican party retained its
legislative majority in the 2018 elections, but Democrats were elected
governor and attorney general.4 0 In fast-moving sessions-Wisconsin's bills,
spanning hundreds of pages, were released late on a Friday afternoon and
voted on overnight Tuesday 4 -the lame-duck legislatures moved to limit
executive power.4 2 In Michigan, the most controversial changes to executive
power either died in the legislature or were vetoed by the governor. In
Wisconsin, after issuing public statements characterizing the laws as neutral,
good-government measures, Governor Walker signed the bills into law. (The

75.6 (N.C. 2016) (transferring gubernatorial power over K-12 education to the superintendent of
public instruction); id. at §§ 116-31, 116-233 (modifying trustee appointments for the state
university system).
37. See N.C. S.B. 4 § 99-77 (modifying the terms of the industrial commissioners).
38. Craig Jarvis, North Carolina Governor Signs Bill Limiting His Successor's Power,
GOvERNING (Dec. 19, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/tns-mccrorycooper-bill.html [https://perma.cc/XJ2M-6S6L].
39. Tara Golshan, North Carolina Wrote the Playbook Wisconsin and Michigan Are Using to
Undermine Democracy, Vox (Dec. 5, 2018, 1:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/12/5/18125544/north-carolina-power-grab-wisconsin-michigan-lame-duck
[https://perma.cc/CP3U-E4JT].
40. Tara Golshan, Tony Evers Elected Governorof Wisconsin: DemocratsFinally UnseatScott
Walker, Vox (Nov. 7, 2018, 1:41 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/7/18055426/midtermelection-results-wisconsin-governor-tony-evers-winner
[https://perma.cc/7UGM-PXMK];
Kathleen Gray, Dems Make Gains in Michigan and Congress, But Blue Wave FallsShort, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Nov. 7, 2018, 6:58 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/
11/07/democrats-michigan-house-senate/1835284002/ [https://perma.cc/TN82-P7VY]; Maayan
Silver, Policy Changes To Look For With Wisconsin'sNew DemocraticAttorney General, WUWM
89.7 (Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.wuwm.com/post/policy-changes-look-wisconsins-newdemocratic-attorney-general#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/Z3AZ-XM3K].
41. Katelyn Ferral, What Happened While You Slept: A Guide to Wisconsin's Lame-Duck
Legislative Session, CAP TIMES (Dec. 5, 2018), https://madison.com/ct/news/local/govt-andpolitics/what-happened-while-you-slept-a-guide-to-wisconsin-s/article_2b2bb8a3-9166-5ada9a0a-be3e7deb4486.html [https://perma.cc/PV2H-KXEN] (providing a timeline of legislative
developments). On Michigan's timing, see Steve Carmody et al., Bills Continue to Fly Through
Lame-Duck Session in Its Final Week, MICH. RADIO (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.michiganradio
.org/post/bills-continue-fly-through-laine-duck-session-its-final-week
[https://perma.cc/ZLQ4UTY8].
42. Shawn Johnson & Laurel White, Wisconsin Legislature Works Overnight to Approve
Limiting Gov.-Elect Tony Evers' Power, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 5, 2018, 8:40 AM),
https://www.wpr.org/wisconsin-legislature-works-overnight-approve-limiting-gov-elect-tonyevers-power [https://perma.cc/5BY5-84EU].
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States and the "urgent necessity" for the President and Executive Branch
officials to live up to their constitutional responsibility, whether or not the
Court ordered them to do so. 25 That constitutional obligation endures, from
the first version of the Travel Ban through today.
As was widely publicized, President Trump fired Acting Attorney
General Sally Yates during his first month in office after she, exactly
consistent with the role outlined by Justice Kennedy, refused to defend the
legality of the President's first Travel Ban. 26 Less known was that, in a radical
breach of norms, lawyers in the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC), who act by delegated authority and under the supervision of
the Attorney General,27 reportedly had been ordered by White House officials
to keep secret from Yates that they were reviewing the Travel Ban.2 8
Fundamentally, a judicial ruling declining to enjoin a presidential action
on grounds of deference (as the Court declined with regard to the third Travel
Ban) does nothing to diminish the President's independent constitutional
obligation to act lawfully and to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed" by Executive Branch officials. 29 Contrary to President Trump's
twisted tweet claiming victory, and as Justice Kennedy strongly implied, after
the Court's ruling the President continued to bear the constitutional
responsibility to repeal the unlawful Travel Ban-as an "anxious world"
continued to watch.30
Instead, President Trump continued to shirk his constitutional
responsibilities and falsely claim the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. The
saga of the constitutionality of the various Travel Bans is one illustration of
the need for an improved shared public understanding of the relative roles of
the judiciary and the Executive Branch with regard to the legality of
executive action. To reclaim and restore constitutional norms requires a
deeper common understanding of what those norms are and why the courts
by structure and necessity will play only a limited role in sustaining them,
even when they rise to constitutional obligations and violate constitutional
rights.
I have had many occasions over the last three decades to consider the
rule-of-law norms that govern presidential action, both as a lawyer and as an
academic. Most directly relevant, I served during the Clinton Administration
in the U.S. Department of Justice including as the acting head of OLC, which

25. Id.
26. Ryan Lizza, Why Sally Yates Stood Up to Trump, NEW YORKER (May 29, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/why-sally-yates-stood-up-to-trump
[https://perma.cc/S9R7-JFRN].
27. About the Office, U.S. Dep't Just.: Off. Legal Couns., https://wwwjustice.gov/olc
[https://perma.cc/82XG-GEJB].
28. Lizza, supra note 26.
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
30. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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is charged with advising the President and Executive Branch officials on
matters of law."' Paramount among its responsibilities, OLC provides the
President (typically via the Counsel to the President) legal advice to help
guide the fulfillment of constitutional responsibilities in conformity with all
applicable laws, consistent with the Take Care Clause3 2 and the presidential
oath of office.33 OLC has a longstanding, nonpartisan tradition of giving
accurate, untainted legal advice-of telling presidents "no" when the law so
dictates and not allowing desired policy ends to drive legal analysis. If an
answer is no, OLC helps develop lawful alternatives. Former heads of OLC
during administrations of both parties describe the role of OLC and the
Attorney General in this way.34
OLC typically operates outside of public view, but the office came under
close scrutiny and perhaps is best known for a period when it sharply deviated
from traditional norms in advising on certain national security matters
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This was revealed by the leaking of a
classified OLC memorandum that included among its deeply flawed
conclusions that the President as Commander in Chief had authority to act
contrary to federal statutes that prohibited the use of torture." Harvard law
professor Jack Goldsmith has written about taking charge of OLC in 2003
and working to restore its traditions-and being told that he would have
blood on his hands if he persisted. 6 James Comey, whom President Trump

31. I served first as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General (1993-1996) to Assistant Attorney
General Walter Dellinger and later as the Acting Assistant Attorney General heading OLC (19971998).
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
33. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 ("I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute
the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States.").
34. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on
Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1559, 1582 n.100 (2007) (quoting statements made during U.S.
Senate confirmation hearings by Republican nominees to the Department of Justice: Alberto
Gonzales, Timothy Flanigan, and Steven Bradbury).
35. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886061/download [https://perma.cc/GK9S-B2CW]. After the OLC
memorandum leaked, the Bush Administration disavowed it and OLC eventually issued a new
memorandum to replace it. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Dec. 30,
2004), https://www.justice.gov/file/1 879 1/download [https://perma.cc/LY4B-SJDE] (stating that
this memorandum supersedes the August 2002 memorandum).
36. See Preserving the Rule of Law in the Fight Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 29-32 (2007) (statement of Jack Landman Goldsmith, Henry
L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) (discussing his efforts to revive OLC's
traditional norms and practices in the face, for example, of David Addington's warning that "the
blood of 100,000 people who die in the next attack would be on [Goldsmith's] hands" if he
persisted); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 10-12 (2007) ("I was astonished, and
immensely worried, to discover that some of our most important counterterrorism policies rested on
severely damaged legal foundations.").
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fired from his position as FBI Director, similarly has described pressures to
twist legal analysis to match desired policy outcomes when he served as
President Bush's Acting Attorney General.37 In his first months in office,
President Barack Obama took a series of actions that expressly rejected the
Bush Administration's theory of unilateral and preclusive presidential war
powers and otherwise aimed to restore rule-of-law norms.3 8
The notorious leaked OLC advice with regard to torture prompted me to
work with eighteen former OLC lawyers to detail the nonpartisan norms that
traditionally have guided OLC's work. In 2004, we published ten "Principles
to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel."" The third principle bears quotation
here for its similarity to Justice Kennedy's later pronouncement in the context
of the Travel Ban:
In formulating its best view of what the law requires, OLC always
should be mindful that the President's legal obligations are not limited
to those that are judicially enforceable. In some circumstances, OLC's
advice will guide executive branch action that the courts are unlikely
to review (for example, action unlikely to result in a justiciable case
or controversy) or that the courts likely will review only under a
standard of extreme deference (for example, some questions regarding
war powers and national security). OLC's advice should reflect its
best view of all applicable legal constraints, and not only legal
constraints likely to lead to judicial invalidation of executive branch
action. An OLC approach that instead would equate "lawful" with
"likely to escape judicial condemnation" would ill serve the
President's constitutional duty by failing to describe all legal
constraints and by appearing to condone unlawful action as long as
the President could, in a sense, get away with it. Indeed, the absence

37. See PreservingProsecutorialIndependence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizingthe
Hiringand Firingof U.S. Attorneys?: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
213-40 (2007) (statement of James B. Comey, former Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United States)
(describing inappropriate pressures from White House officials and threatened resignations in
response from Department of Justice officials); JAMES COMEY, A HIGHER LOYALTY 74-115 (2018)
(describing multiple instances of such pressures); id. at 86 ("[V]ice [P]resident [Cheney] looked at
me gravely and said . . . '[t]housands of people are going to die because of what you are doing."');
id. at 106 ("The United States Department of Justice had made serious legal mistakes in advising
the president and his administration about surveillance and interrogation.").
38. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on National
Security (May 21, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-national-security-5-21-09 [https://perma.cc/3Q4Q-43V4] (announcing that because
"these tactics were on ... the wrong side of history," they must be left in the past-"where they
belong"); Johnsen, supra note 3, at 150 (noting the Obama Administration's rejection of "extreme
interrogation methods, black sites, and indefinite detention").
39. Johnsen, supra note 34, at 1578; see also Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting
Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Attorneys of the Office
of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice (July 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KSU-LX2U] (describing
OLC best practices for opinions).
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of a litigation threat signals special need for vigilance: In
circumstances in which judicial oversight of executive branch action
is unlikely, the President-and by extension OLC-has a special
obligation to ensure compliance with the law, including respect for the
rights of affected individuals and the constitutional allocation of
powers.4 0
President Trump's apparent disdain for this foundational norm-and
penchant for instead inappropriately proceeding in terms of litigation risk,
what he can "get away with," to the extent he considers legal constraintsperhaps was best captured in his disingenuous announcement of a national
emergency to justify building a border wall that Congress refused to fund. 4 1
In a video clip that went viral, President Trump speculated in an unusual singsong voice about his odds of prevailing in litigation that challenged his
national emergency declaration, even while acknowledging "I didn't need to
do this"42 :
[T]hey will sue us in the Ninth Circuit even though it shouldn't be
there, and we will possibly get a bad ruling, and then we'll get another
bad ruling, and then we'll end up in the Supreme Court and hopefully
we'll get a fair shake and we'll win in the Supreme Court just like the
Ban.43

Notably, Justice Kennedy, whose concurrence called for Executive Branch
vigilance in legal compliance, has been replaced by Justice Brett Kavanaugh.
Our constitutional democracy is built on often-unwritten but essential
behaviors and expectations that protect what the world has shown can be
fragile democracies. Respect for the rule of law. Respect for democratic
processes. Respect for governmental institutions. Exercises in identifying
those norms, as in the "Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel,"
should inform efforts to reclaim and restore the constitutional norms that

40. Johnsen, supra note 34, at 1605. Presidents dating back to George Washington have
recognized their obligation to ensure the legality of their actions and have sought legal counsel from
Executive Branch officials, famously including the question of the constitutionality of the First Bank
of the United States. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). President Washington,
by way of his Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, notably also sought assistance from the U.S.
Supreme Court regarding the United States' treaty obligations, which the Court declined to provide
and instead referred the President to "the power given by the Constitution to the President, of calling
on the heads of departments for opinions." Letter from John Jay to George Washington (July 20,
1793), in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 258 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
41. Aaron Blake, 'IDidn'tNeed To Do This': Trump Just Kneecapped His Casefora 'National
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President Trump has undermined and that, in fact, he seems quite
conspicuously to relish dismantling. Constitutional norms can be promoted,
too, by the honoring and repeating of stories of individuals, Republican and
Democratic officials, standing up for the rule of law. Acting Attorney
General Sally Yates standing in opposition to President Trump's
unconstitutional Travel Ban, at the price of her job. The dramatic race to the
hospital (and later threatened resignations) by Acting Attorney General
James Comey, head of OLC Jack Goldsmith, and FBI Director Robert
Mueller, to prevent senior Bush White House officials from pressuring a very
sick Attorney General John Ashcroft to overrule objections and authorize the
continuation of unlawful counterterrorism surveillance." We are reminded
that it can require courageous actions of individuals and institutions to protect
fundamental norms in the face of presidential threats. And that we must strive
to elect presidents who will adhere to constitutional norms and use the powers
of their office to secure those norms into the future.

44. COMEY, supra note 37, at 87-99.

